Abstract
This paper studies the complexity of the pricing system for the production of low‐carbon and nonlow‐carbon products in a market composed of duopoly manufacturers under the cap‐and‐trade policies. Through nonlinear system theory and numerical derivation and simulation, it considers the influence of different market power structures, carbon trading prices, consumer environmental awareness, and other factors on price decisions, carbon emission decisions, profits, and system stability. The influence of price adjustment parameters and unit product carbon emission decision adjustment parameters on the complexity of the pricing system under different market power structures is analyzed. And, it was found that compared with the variable feedback chaos control method, the parameter adjustment chaos control method is more effective in controlling the pricing system in this paper. Our research provides management implications for market competition and operational decision‐making for low‐carbon and nonlow‐carbon products.
Highlights
In the past few decades, the impact of carbon emissions on the environment has become increasingly severe
E carbon cap-and-trade policy with market attributes is an efficient and sustainable development policy. e carbon trading mechanism has covered more than 40 countries worldwide
A unified global carbon trading market has not yet been formed, different carbon trading markets have begun to connect with each other. e government’s carbon allowance and trading policy is that the government allocates emission quotas or emission permits to pollutant-producing companies based on the emission level within a certain period of time. e government’s carbon cap-and-trade policy is that the government allocates emission quotas or emission permits to pollutant producers based on emission
Summary
In the past few decades, the impact of carbon emissions on the environment has become increasingly severe. Luo and Chen [20] studied the optimal pricing and emission reduction policies of two competing manufacturers with different emission reduction efficiencies under the cap-and-trade policies It has the same research purpose as literature [19], but it considers the market competition of manufacturers after carbon emission reduction. E above kinds of literature study the price competition problem between two manufacturers with different production efficiencies from the perspective of static game, but they do not consider market power structures. E literature [25], under different market power structures, studied the optimal low-carbon investment and price decisions It found that manufacturers who produce green products with high-efficiency emission reductions cannot guarantee high profits compared with inefficient manufacturers. Erefore, this paper uses nonlinear dynamic analysis to study the price competition of low-carbon products and nonlow-carbon products between duopoly manufacturers with different market power structures under the cap-and-trade policies. Manufacturer 2 (m2) produces nonlow-carbon (NLP) products and competes with m1 in price. ere was little difference between the functions of LP and NLP, with
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