Abstract
The game models were used to study the mechanism of coal-electricity price conflict under conditions of double price regulations of coal and electricity. Based on this, the peak shaving reserve mechanism was designed to probe into the countermeasures against the coal-electricity price conflicts. The study revealed that in the boom seasons of coal demand, the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply thermal coal and the electricity enterprises to order thermal coal are reduced under conditions of double price regulations. However, under the circumstances of coal price marketization, in the boom seasons of coal demand the thermal coal price may go up obviously, the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply thermal coal are increased, and meanwhile the initiatives of the power enterprises to order thermal coal are decreased dramatically. The transportation capacity constraint of coal supply leads to the evident decrease of the initiatives of coal enterprises for the thermal coal supply. The mechanism of peak shaving reserve of thermal coal may not only reduce the price of coal market but also increase the enthusiasm of the power enterprises to order more thermal coal and the initiatives of the coal enterprises to supply more thermal coal.
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