Research on Cooperation Incentives for Emergency Logistics Capacity Reserve from Humanitarian Organization Perspective

Abstract

Recently, catastrophic events have occurred frequently, seriously threatening the safety of people's lives and property. The uncertainty in the demand for emergency logistics resources poses a huge challenge for emergency stockpiling. From the perspective of humanitarian organizations, cooperation with third-party logistics providers for emergency logistics capacity reserve can improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of reserve. However, in practice, there is a lack of unity of purpose, capacity mismatch and information asymmetry between the two rescue parties, which makes cooperative emergency reserve a problem worth studying. This paper addresses the emergency logistics capacity reserve problem and take a two-level supply chain consisting of humanitarian organization and third-party logistics provider as the research object to explore the cooperative reserve model between the two sides. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model with humanitarian organization as the leader and third-party logistics provider as the follower based on the premise of mutual cooperation. Under different incentive models of cooperation, the humanitarian organization executes the price decision to minimize the deprivation cost and disaster relief cost, and the third-party logistics provider executes the stockpiling decision to maximize the revenue. Secondly, this paper discusses the equilibrium decisions of both sides of the game under different scenarios and provides corresponding numerical analysis. Finally, this paper finds that for the possible moral hazard problem of third-party logistics provider, humanitarian organization incentives and government subsidies have a positive effect on third-party logistics provider's stockpiling; while the effect of corporate reputation depends on their donation behavior.