Research on Coalitions in the Triad: Findings, Problems and Strategy

Abstract

sion of tertius gaudens (3). Its purposes are, first, to present data which appear to be relevant to hypotheses drawn from Caplow's theory and from Simmel's theorizing; second, to raise questions about the adequacy of the experimental procedure and the data obtained to test certain of these hypotheses. Caplow examines the model of the triad whose members differ in power, calling attention to a neglected feature of this model, namely, that the formation of given coalitions depends on the initial distribution of power, and other things being equal, may be predicted to some extent when the initial distribution of power is known. Four assumptions underlie his predictions: C1. Members of a triad may differ in strength. A stronger member can control a weaker member, and will seek to do so. 2. Each member of the triad seeks control over the others. Control over two others is preferred to control over one. Control over one other is preferred to control over none. 3. Strength is additive. The strength of a coalition is equal to the sum of the strengths of its two members. 4. The formation of coalitions takes place in an existing triadic situation, so that there is a precoalition condition in every triad. Any attempt by a stronger member to coerce a weaker member into joining a nonadvantageous coalition will provoke the formation of an advantageous coalition to oppose the coercion. 2 Caplow considers six types of triads, differing in initial (pre-coalition) distribution of power. These appear in Table 1 along with his predictions. For example, in triad type 3, he predicts that the coalition formed will include the weak man along with (either) one of the two equally strong. This predic