Research on a collaborative evolution model of multi-airport route network considering subsidy strategies.

Abstract

To efficiently utilize subsidy strategies for optimizing multi-airport route networks and promoting collaborative development among multiple airports, we delve into the tripartite strategic interactions between passengers, airlines and airports. A dual-layer game-theoretic model is constructed to optimize subsidy strategies, facilitating a synergistic alignment between multi-airport positioning and route networks. In the upper-layer game-theoretic model, Fermi rules are employed to analyze the interplay between pricing strategies of distinct airline brands and passenger travel preferences, aiding in determining optimal pricing strategies for airlines. The lower-layer game-theoretic model introduces an asymmetric stochastic best response equilibrium (QRE) model, drawing insights from optimal airline pricing and the impact of airport subsidies on airline route adjustments to formulate effective multi-airport subsidy strategies. The results reveal that: (ⅰ) Airline revenues display varying peaks based on travel distances, with optimal fare discount intervals clustering between 0.6 and 0.9, contingent upon travel distances and passenger rationality; (ⅱ) dynamic monopolistic intervals and inefficient ranges characterize airport subsidy strategies due to diverse competitive strategies employed by rivals; (ⅲ) targeted airport subsidy strategies can enhance inter-airport route coordination in alignment with their functional positioning. This research provides decision-making insights into collaborative airport group development, encompassing airport subsidy strategies and considerations for airline pricing.