Rescuing Ontological Individualism

Francesco Guala

doi:10.1017/psa.2021.35

Abstract

AbstractStandard defenses of ontological individualism are challenged by arguments that exploit the dependence of social facts on material facts—that is, facts that are not about human individuals. In this article, I discuss Brian Epstein’s “materialism” inThe Ant Trap: granting Epstein’s strict definition of individualism, I show that his arguments depend crucially on a generous conception of social properties and social facts. Individualists, however, are only committed to the claim thatprojectibleproperties are individualistically realized, and materialists have not undermined this claim.

Highlights

Philosophers of social science generally agree that individualism is not one but many different theses
The main reason why it is in relatively good shape is probably that ontological individualism” (OI) is nowadays considered harmless: practically no one believes that OI can be used to defend methodological individualism (MI), as some philosophers had once hoped
I take, that the materialist challenge has substantial, rather than merely terminological import: regardless of who endorses either version of OI, the issue is whether material properties play a significant role in social metaphysics or not

Summary

Introduction

Philosophers of social science generally agree that individualism is not one but many different theses. 2 According to methodological individualists, only explanations that refer to individual properties (laws, facts, etc.) are satisfactory or legitimate in the social sciences. Granting Epstein his preferred definition of individualism, I will show that the success of materialism depends on the endorsement of a “generous” conception of social properties and social facts Against such a conception, I will argue that individualists are committed only to the claim that a particular subset of social properties are individualistically realized – namely, those properties that occur in scientific explanations. The point to keep in mind – which will play a key role in the argument that follows – is that multiple realization does not concern “generic” properties It is a thesis about the sort of properties that are mentioned in the theories of science. Before we come to that, it is necessary to present the materialist argument in more detail

The Materialist Argument

Materialism as “Extended Individualism”

The Multiple Realization of What?

Materialistic Social Science?

Concluding Remarks