Rereading Marx For The Non-Marxist Economist: On The Scope And Method Of Scientific Economics∗

Abstract

It is widely recognized that Marx was prescient in identifying and addressing theoretically a number of economic issues (e.g., concen? tration, the business cycle, poverty amid plenty, technological un? employment, the persistence of unemployment) which were only at a later date given theoretical legitimacy when taken up by economists more sympathetic to both capitalism and the orthodox academy. Yet surprisingly, orthodox economists have all but ignored Marx's work. If he is studied at all, he is generally treated as a curiosum, a minor post-Ricardian, or as an example of how not to do economics, [e.g., Samuelson, 1962, p. 12; Schumpeter, 1954, esp. pp. 685 ff.] In many instances, such reactions might emanate from ideological predisposi? tion, but for those who strive to transcend ideology, the rejection of Marx is usually founded on a judgment that either his theories have not withstood the testing of scientific economics or his methodology was not scientific. The scientific standards which orthodox economists attempt to de? ploy to determine the validity of theories are those which have been thought to typify the paragon science, physics. Briefly stated, a scien? tifically valid theory must be logically consistent internally, and hy? potheses deduced from this body of theory must be empirically testable and capable of surviving such testing. The successful empirical con? firmation of hypotheses lends empirical credulity to the body of theory from which it was deduced. When examined according to these cri? teria and in terms of what orthodox economists view as the appropriate subject domain of economic science, Marx's economic theory is gen? erally found to fall short of science on both counts. In terms of in? ternal logical consistency, Marx's theory of value is supposedly in? capable of adequately accounting for prices. In terms of the empirical testability criterion, Marx's theory is judged as failing on two counts: First, his body of theory does not readily generate hypotheses which