Abstract

This chapter turns to the nature and form of requirements of structural rationality. It presents a recipe for generating requirements of structural rationality from verdicts about which states are incoherent (by the account defended in the previous chapter). On the resulting view, requirements of structural rationality are prohibitions on (incoherent) combinations of states. The chapter compares this with the closely related view that the requirements of rationality are “wide-scope” before reframing the debate over the scope of rational requirements and arguing for a view that is wide-scope, rather than narrow-scope, in spirit. It also argues that requirements of structural rationality are synchronic rather than diachronic. Finally, it defends the view that the demands of structural rationality are best thought of as requirements at all against a recent challenge.

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