Abstract
This paper studies the impact of strategic monitoring on reputation building, focusing in particular on models of the principal-agent type. The main result is that the principal always will monitor risk-neutral agents more closely early in the game, while such agents may or may not work harder as the game progresses, depending on their initial reputation. If agents are sufficiently risk-averse, they will always work harder early in the game, whereas the principal may or may not monitor such agents more closely as the game progresses.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Similar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.