Abstract
This article examines the normative status of border controls from a neo-republican perspective, grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination. It makes use of Philip Pettit’s account of this kind of freedom and discusses Pettit’s own remarks on the status of border controls. Against Pettit, it argues that the domination generated by border controls is ineliminable given existing political institutions, because such controls cannot avoid subjecting non-citizens to coercion in ways that are not forced to track their interests. The article also argues for an alternative neo-republican account of border controls that does not deny their coerciveness but allows for certain border control policies in non-ideal circumstances.
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