Repression and Repertoires

Abstract

We formalize Tilly's (1978, 2006, 2008) concept of repertoires of contentious actions, and analyze how the structure of state repression affects the variety of observed contentious actions. Introducing the notion of repertoire width, we show that when state repression accelerates with higher levels of anti-regime actions, opposition leaders tend to call for many different forms of contentious actions, thereby generating a wider repertoire. In contrast, when repression decelerates with higher contentious actions, opposition leaders tend to call for few different forms of contentious actions, thereby generating a narrower repertoire. This result applies to both Tilly’s bounded rationality mode, in which opposition leaders must choose from a predetermined set of contentious actions (rigid/strong repertoire); and to his efficiency model, in which leader can freely innovate and design contentious actions (weak/no repertoire). Methodologically, citizen interactions is modeled as a multi-action global game, and the leader’s problem is a simple mechanism without transfers.