Representing the Constituency: Institutional Design and Legislative Behaviour

Abstract

ABSTRACT In most democratic countries, elected officials must balance the interests of their constituents against the interests of the broader electorate. One factor that is thought to affect this balance is the nature of the political offices that politicians occupy. Is this assumption true? We investigate the effect of one’s elected position on the likelihood of raising local issues in legislative assemblies by examining the Nunatsiavut Assembly, the legislative body of the Nunatsiavut Government in Labrador, Canada. The Assembly is unique because of the diverse range of elected positions that comprise it, which vary significantly in terms of the kinds of representational incentives that they impose upon their office holders. We assess the effect of these different positions on the likelihood of raising local issues by analyzing 48 Nunatsiavut Hansards using computer-assisted dictionary analysis. We also draw upon six elite interviews with current members. On balance, the evidence suggests that one’s position does affect the likelihood of raising local issues in legislative assemblies.