Representing negated statements: when false possibilities also play in the mind

Abstract

ABSTRACT Some possibilities (e.g. “there are roses and lilies”) are true given a particular expression (e.g. “If there are roses, then there are lilies”) but false given another (e.g. “It is not the case that there are roses and lilies”). Deductive theories disagree about what people have in mind after reading these sentences. This research reports the results of two priming experiments that examine the mental representations underlying the comprehension of negated conjunctions, affirmative conjunctions and affirmative conditionals. Experiment 1 revealed that people have more accessible true possibilities when they are explicit models than false possibilities, but true and false possibilities are equally accessible to them when both are in the initial models. Experiment 2 extended this to show that for both true and false possibilities, the initial models are the most accessible possibilities. We discuss the implications of the results for theories of reasoning.