Abstract
In this essay, I will expand the philosophical discussion about the representational practice in science to examine its role in science education through four case studies. The cases are of what I call ‘educational laboratory experiments’ (ELEs), performative models used representationally by students to come to a better understanding of theoretical knowledge of a scientific discipline. The studies help to demonstrate some idiosyncratic features of representational practices in science education, most importantly a lack of novelty and discovery built into the ELEs as their methodology is solidified when it becomes a widely spread educational tool within a discipline. There is thus an irreducible role for the historical development of ELEs in understanding their representational nature and use. The important role of the historical development of ELEs leads to an interesting way that educators can use ELEs as a means of connecting students to important historical developments within their disciplines.
Highlights
IntroductionAs numerous investigations have revealed, the representational practices of science are numerous, wide-reaching, complex, and varied.2 Some philosophical studies of this complex practice have been made by examining different sorts of representational vehicles, including models (Morgan and Morrison 1999; Knuuttila 2005, 2011; Bailer-Jones 2003; Mäki 2009;
Better understanding the representational nature of educational laboratory experiments’ (ELEs) can be of great use in better understanding other forms of scientific representational vehicles which lack novelty – e.g., representational vehicles found in journal articles, grant applications, and so on are similar to ELEs insofar as they are successful precisely when they make certain theoretical points clearer
Another reason it is important to attend to representational vehicles which lack an element of novelty, apart from the aim of better understanding representational practice in all its forms, is that measures of normative evaluation for these representational vehicles are distinct from those which do include a role for novel predictions or explanation
Summary
As numerous investigations have revealed, the representational practices of science are numerous, wide-reaching, complex, and varied.2 Some philosophical studies of this complex practice have been made by examining different sorts of representational vehicles, including models (Morgan and Morrison 1999; Knuuttila 2005, 2011; Bailer-Jones 2003; Mäki 2009;
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
