Representative Democracy and Social Equality

SEAN INGHAM

doi:10.1017/s000305542100109x

Abstract

When are inequalities in political power undemocratic, and why? While some writers condemn any inequalities in political power as a deviation from the ideal of democracy, this view is vulnerable to the simple objection that representative democracies concentrate political power in the hands of elected officials rather than distributing it equally among citizens, but they are no less democratic for it. Building on recent literature that interprets democracy as part of a broader vision of social equality, I argue that concentrations of political power are incompatible with democracy, and with a commitment to social equality more generally, when they consist in some having greater arbitrary power to influence decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences. A novel account of the relationship between power and social status clarifies the role of social equality in the justification of democracy, including a representative democracy in which public officials have more political power than ordinary citizens.

Highlights

Democracy has been justified on the grounds that it is necessary for realizing a broader vision of social equality, of a society whose members relate to each other as equals rather than as occupants of different ranks in a social hierarchy (Anderson 2009; Christiano 2008; González-Ricoy and Queralt 2018; Kolodny 2014; 2019; Viehoff 2014; Wilson 2019)
The equal distribution of political power is thought to be necessary for realizing the ideal of social equality, and it is because democracy is assumed to distribute political power —or at least more than alternative regimes—that the value of social equality is thought to weigh in its favor
On the account I have proposed, social equality requires an equal distribution of arbitrary power to influence political decisions

Summary

Introduction

Democracy has been justified on the grounds that it is necessary for realizing a broader vision of social equality, of a society whose members relate to each other as equals rather than as occupants of different ranks in a social hierarchy (Anderson 2009; Christiano 2008; González-Ricoy and Queralt 2018; Kolodny 2014; 2019; Viehoff 2014; Wilson 2019). What social equality requires is an equal distribution, not of power per se but of arbitrary power to influence political decisions according to one’s idiosyncratic preferences, and this is what democracy promises, in its electoral form or otherwise.

Results

Conclusion