Abstract
This paper attempts to understand how political entrepreneurs choose which policies to support. Two opposing camps of contemporary public choice place the weight on either the result of the choice of the rationally-ignorant median voter, or at the mercy of interest groups who capture regulation to suit their interests. I combine the two as opposing forces of a quasi-market for political support, which provides signals for political entrepreneurs to calculate which policy programs are worth implementing. I extend and apply this metaphor to sketch a narrative of the behavior of the fuzzy border between public and private action in an entangled political economy.
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