Representations of authority and children's moral reasoning

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between alternative sources of authority which might influence a child's moral reasoning. It returns to Piaget's (1932) work to explore features of a child's social relations which may act either to promote or constrain the communication and acceptance of moral knowledge. Children were asked to judge which of two boys was naughtier in one of Piaget's moral ‘stories’. Those who had independently given different responses were placed in a pair and asked to agree a response together. An authority of status was introduced into some pairs by varying the gender composition of the dyad and contrasted with epistemic authority derived from the arguments more closely associated with moral autonomy. In the absence of an authority of status (in same-sex pairs) influence through epistemic authority occurred with relative ease. When status and epistemic authority conflicted subjects took far longer to accept the legitimacy of the epistemic authority. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.