Abstract
Abstract Many debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions, and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). This chapter outlines a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. It argues that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive science, suggests that representational kinds are multilevel. This is to say that representational kinds’ properties cluster at different levels of explanation and allow for intra- and interlevel projections.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
