Representational Counterbalancing: The Case of Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries in Canada

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper argues that when heads of government appoint politicians to government teams, they focus on a particular range of the appointees’ representational attributes and construct selection pools for other team positions with an eye toward counterbalancing the appointees’ salient representational attributes. Previous research has investigated horizontal counterbalancing, which takes place within teams whose members have roughly equal status (e.g., cabinets). This paper suggests that there is additional value to be gained by examining vertical counterbalancing, which occurs when selectors appoint subordinates whose attributes counterbalance those of their superiors. Empirically, the paper spotlights teams of federal cabinet ministers and parliamentary secretaries in Canada from 1963-2021. It demonstrates that prime ministers have used parliamentary secretary appointments to counterbalance—in order—the provincial/territorial, linguistic, gender, and ethnic attributes of the ministers they serve. It shows that caucus characteristics, partisanship, and (to some extent) prime ministers’ personal identities condition their counterbalancing behaviours.