Abstract
This research capitalizes on the analytical opportunity created by mandatory retirement provisions to explore the nature of the electoral connection in state supreme courts and to illustrate how changes in institutional context can modify the decisional propensities of political elites and reshape their fundamental roles. Specifically, this work demonstrates that mandatory retirement obviates the representative function by disconnecting key mechanisms through which public preferences are translated into judicial votes: threat conditions that elevate the risk of electoral censure. In state supreme courts, popular votes are in part strategic and result from a complex interaction of goals, institutions, and external pressures.
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