Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition

Abstract

The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view, however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.