Reporting under Ignorance – Is it a Lie if I Don't Know?

Abstract

We study self-serving reporting behavior when people are ignorant on whether they are dishonest or telling the truth. We argue that the costs of making a (potentially) dishonest report under ignorance are smaller than the behavioral costs of a deliberate lie. In our laboratory reporting task, subjects are either eligible to a high payoff or a low payoff. One dimension varies the available information on the eligibility to payoffs, and the other dimension the ex-ante probability distribution of payoffs. Ignorance on the eligibility to payoffs leads to a pronounced increase in the fraction of unjustified claims of the high payoffs. While the probability dimension has only a small effect per se, the combination with ignorance is detrimental for truthful reporting. Potential explanations include the highly controversial social norm for reporting under ignorance. Further results indicate that most subjects are information seeking when having the opportunity to choose the preferred information regime.