Abstract
Murali Ramachandran and I are agreed that there is away to block the objection he raised in Ramachandran(1992) to the account of rigid designation and contingent identity I gave in Gallois (1986). But he argues that although the modified account I gave in Gallois (1993) does block the original objection, a deeper problem remains. He is right to think that the deeper problem is a serious objection to any account of contingent identity that means what it says. That is, any account of contingent identity which is an account of contingent identity. If I am right, Ramachandran's deeper problem is posed by the so called modal argument for the necessity of identities advanced by Saul Kripke (1971). As I hope to show, that argument can be met, and Ramachandran's deeper problem solved. How does Ramachandran set up his deeper problem? In Gallois (1993) I offer the following necessary and sufficient condition for a term restrictedly rigidly designating:
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