Reply to Professor Forester

Abstract

P ROFESSOR FORESTER CLAIMS that we have misread Habermas and that had we paid closer attention to his discussions of rationality, systematic distortion, communication and truth, we would have found that Arendt and Habermas are not nearly so far apart. (197) We disagree but hasten to add, in what we trust will be a refreshing opening to our rejoinder, that Forester has not misread us. Before proceeding to take up the major sources of Professor Forester's argument with our interpretation of Habermas we want to address some less crucial complaints that he has with our essay. We appreciate the awkwardness of associating as prolific a theorist as Habermas with any particular tradition of discourse. Critical Theory is as troublesome a generic description of a tradition as Christian or Marxist. Nevertheless, we insist on associating Habermas' work with the general theoretical objectives of the Frankfurt School. This is not idiosyncratic. Thus, Thomas McCarthy introduces his translation of Legitimation Crisis by noting that Habermas' work may be viewed as Picking up where Adorno left off. and, further, that discussion of Habermas may be reasonably pursued by considering how Habermas' theory responds to two complexes of problems left unresolved by the critical theory of the early Frankfurt School.' Our essay, consequently, attempted to identify one of those controlling objectives; namely, the imposition, discovery or identification of those philosophical norms