Reply to Professor Brinton

Abstract

In my paper, ‘Agnosticism’, I asked the reader to consider the following three propositions. (1) There is more evidence for theism than for atheism. (2) There is more evidence for atheism than for theism. (3) There is roughly the same amount of evidence for both. And I claimed that if it is not known which of (1) to (3) is true, then theism, atheism and agnosticism (suspension of judgement without the claim that this is the epistemically superior position) are all equally rational positions. As against that claim, Professor Brinton cites the following epistemic principle: When the state of the evidence on some question ‘p?’ is uncertain, suspension of belief is the most appropriate doxastic attitude. However, my paper contained the seeds of a refutation of this principle. I wrote there that the agnostic