Reply to Ostertag

Abstract

7Jiscussion REPLY TO OSTERTAG ] AN DEJNOZKA Rackham School of Graduate Studies/ U. of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA DEJNOZKA@JUNO.COM Gary Ostertag's reviewof my book, BertrandRussell onModalityand Logical Relevance,'turns everything he discusses upside down. Thus I am glad that he also ignores over nine tenths of my book. Ostertag says, "It appears then, that Russell is, if anything, hostile to the idea that modality plays a fundamental role in logic" (his p. 169). Right. I agree three times (my pp. 1-2, n2-13, 165), and I quote Russell'shostility twice (my pp. 103, 112). But Ostertag bafflingly proclaims, "Dejnozka holds the very opposite. Not only does Russell embrace modality, he espouses a variety of modal logics" (his p. 169). Wrong. I repeatedly proclaim that Russell rejects all modal notions or modal entities, with the sole exception of goodness in his early ethics (my p. 80). And I never say he espouses a modal logic. What then do I find in Russell? Logically implicitmodal logics!I say,"Allseven of the modal logics I find implicit in Russell ... seem closest to S5" (p. 16). I say, "I define seven modal logics which may be implicitly amibuted to Russell" (p. 61). I indicate seven times that I am discussing logically implicit modal logics (my pp. 16, 17,61 twice, 62, 66, 96 quoting Magnell on my views). Even Ostertag unwittingly quotes me as engaged only in formal "paraphrase" (my p. 61, his p. 171). I state the basic message in the Introduction of my book: Russell's idea is simple: co use notions of ordinary quamificarional logic co define and analyze away modal notions. Modal notions are eliminated across rhe board. The individual ("existential") and universal quantifiers are used to simulate and replace modal notions .... Literallyspeaking, Russellhas banished modality from logic. Yerfunctionally speaking, Russell has achieved a modal logic based on a rich and sophisticated theory of modality.... ' Gary Ostertag, "Russell's Modal Logic?", Russeli n.s. 20 (2000): 165-72, reviewing Jan Dejnozka, BertrandRussell on Modalityand L,,gica/ Relevance (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999). russell: theJournalof BertrandRussell Studies The BertrandRussellResearchCentre, McMastcrU. n.s. 2J (summer 20m): 63-7 ISSN 0036--01631 64 Discussion Russell refuses to allow ontological status to modal entities, and refuses to admit modal notions as logicallyprimitive. But if that were the whole story,then there would be no point in writing this book.... But this is only the beginning of the story. (My p. 2, my new emphasis) Thus I scarcely"ignore or glossover ... those contexts in which Russellis critical of modal notions" (Ostertag, p. 169). I quote them (my pp. 103,n2), and I embrace them as half-bur only as half-of my basic message.The messageis that Russell belongs to the crowd of twentieth-century analysts who banish metaphysical necessity, yet who develop sophisticated logical or linguistic eliminative interpretations of necessity to explain away the appearance of necessity.I indicate this messagefiverimes (pp. 1-2, 57-8, 100-1, n2-13, 165). Ostertag says of the three definitions comprising MDL, "This is, of course, nor quite right: we should be defining the first-order quantifiers in terms of modal notions, not the other way around. (Otherwise, we are interpreting the modal operators, not the quantifiers.)" (his p. 169). Wrong. Or else Ostertag is criticizing Russell. Russells definitions are precisely how he interprets-and explains away-modal notions. And strictly speaking, Russell eliminatively defines both the existential quantifier andrhe MDL possibilityoperator as meaning the veridical "F(x) is not always false" (my pp. n2-13). Thus the basic notions ofRussellian quantification are veridical.And even the veridicalnotions are nothing. They are incomplete fi.mctionshaving only veridical meanings-inuse (my pp. 1-2, 23,91,n2-13). Ostertag caJls MDL "trivial" and stipulative (his p. 170), and says it "adds nothing" to the standard understanding of Principia. Wrong. I explain the controversial Parmenidean basis of MDL in Chapters 3-4. Ostertag infers it is trivial to call Principia a modal logic, and goes on to doubt that MDL is S5. Folks, MDL is not the modal logic!I indicate chat eight times (my pp. ix, 3, 16, 62, 80, 96, 194, 196...