Reply to My Critics

Abstract

Reply to My Critics Stefanie Rocknak (bio) §1 Response to Baxter First, let me note that I agree with one of Donald Baxter's opening claims, namely, that Hume often uses the word "object" to include perceptions. Indeed, my entire book is devoted to showing as much. In particular, I show that we must distinguish between three distinct ways in which Hume explains the psychological process whereby we conceptualize an object, or a body. In all three processes, it turns out that objects, or bodies, are perceptions. In particular, they are imagined ideas, and so, in no case, are they mind-independent things. These three processes are: the vulgar process, the philosophical process, and the Humean process. Very briefly, we may distinguish these processes as follows: 1) The vulgar imagine that objects are identical to impressions. 2) The philosophers, in virtue of making a reasoned rejection of the vulgar position, imagine that objects are mind independent and are the causes of our perceptions. However, they are unaware that they are imagining objects. Instead, they think that reason, and reason alone, shows that objects exist as mind-independent entities. 3) Hume thinks that we always imagine that objects are the "invariable and uninterrupted" causes of our perceptions; this is a condition of possibility for almost all thought, including our ability to reason. In this very general respect, we may refer to this as a transcendental conception of objects. However, unfortunately, in the course of his remarks, Baxter does not explicitly acknowledge these distinctions (that is, 1–3 above), both in regard to my reading of Hume, as well as in regard to his own interpretation. Doing so highlights a very significant disagreement between the two of us—in addition to our disagreement about "steadfast objects." [End Page 77] For instance, on the second page of his remarks, after sketching my position regarding the Humean transcendental position on objects, Baxter writes: "I myself do not see how the vulgar could feel the pull of this question … in my view the idea that bodies cause impressions is much further downstream when the philosophers get into the picture" (Baxter, "Comments").1 However, as noted above, I address at length in my book how the transcendental position is related to (and distinct from) both the vulgar and philosophical position. In particular, as far as the vulgar are concerned, they never consciously "feel the pull of this question." According to my reading, it would make sense to say that none of us, including the vulgar, "feel the pull" of this question—rather, almost unconsciously, imagining ideas of objects is something that we must all do, almost immediately it seems, in order to function at all. More specifically, to even think that impressions are identical to "objects" (as the vulgar do), we must first have some idea of what an "object" is such that we mistakenly identify "it" with impressions; in other words, we need what Bennett would call an "objectivity concept."2 With these general remarks in mind, let me now address some of the more specific claims that Baxter makes, beginning with Hume's notion of "reality." §1.1 Reality Baxter writes: "Rocknak takes [Hume's] first system of realities to consist of impressions and memories of impressions and takes the second system of realities to consist of transcendentally imagined causes of the first system" (Baxter, "Comments"). However, this is not quite what is going on in my book. Although I show that transcendentally imagined causes could not belong to the first system of reality, and so, must belong to the second system, my explanation of Hume's two systems of realities is meant to illustrate Hume's notion of justification. In particular, actual impressions, and memories of impressions are "real" and so, in Hume's sense of the word, are "justified." In this respect, everything in the first system of reality is justified. Moreover, I point out at length in my book, that according to Hume, in the second system of reality, we do not necessarily use transcendental causal reasoning. Rather, we also seem to use what I call "indirect causal reasoning" as well as ordinary causation to conclude for example, that Rome exists...