Abstract
I consider the relations of value‐pluralism with liberalism and relativism, and argue that while value‐pluralism is not a species of relativism it does not support the universal claims of liberalism. The political theory implied by value‐pluralism is a Spinozan variety of modus vivendi, and my liberal‐pluralist critics rely on an undefended and implausible theory of history. Having argued that liberalism and value‐pluralism point in divergent directions I consider some questions in Green theory. I go on to respond to the claim that my criticisms of humanism amount to a version of nihilism. I conclude by arguing that the goal of political theory is not to produce a systematic version of current liberal opinion (as in Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium). It is to frame a true view of humans and their circumstances, and see what follows.
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