Abstract
Reply to Harman In Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning, Gilbert Harman endorses a version of contextualism that takes the primary speaker's meaning, or utterer's meaning, of a sentence containing an instance of know that p to vary with epistemically relevant features of the context, such as what the speaker takes for granted in the conversation in which the utterance takes place. But, as I argue below, this construal of contextualism does not help Harman evade the detailed criticisms of contextualist positions I give in K&PI. Nevertheless, I conclude by pointing out that, given his general epistemological commitments, Harman is in fact in a better position to defend epistemic contextualism from some of my detailed criticisms than its other proponents. Why does Harman believe that his version of contextualism, in terms of primary speaker's meaning, evades the detailed criticisms of contextualism given in K&PI? Many of the criticisms I give in K&PI have to do with the mechanism that mediates between the sentence uttered and
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