Abstract
ABSTRACT Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there are no firm answers. Some scholars argue that the current statistical inferential framework is inadequate and therefore we should focus on improving statistical methods. Some others claim instead that the only way to fix science is to change the scientific reward system, promoting quality rather than quantity of scientific publications. However, every positive proposal, either methodological or social, has a valid counterargument. Here I want to make explicit some reasons for explaining the persistence of disagreement on the solutions to the crisis. Focusing on issues which have been overlooked in the debate might help to better evaluate scientific reforms. With this regard, philosophical knowledge can be mobilised to take action in response to the replicability crisis.
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