Repeated game analysis of power suppliers based on dynamic coopetition process and slightly altruistic factor

Abstract

In this paper, based on repeated game theory, the dynamic coopetition game model between power supply enterprises is established to analyze the long-term equilibrium from a more practical point of view. The slightly altruistic factor is used as a measurement of system cooperation degree, and the influence of the variation between slightly altruistic factor and discount rate is considered in the long-term dynamic equilibrium. The results show that only part of coopetition can find the feasible discount rate to maintain long-term equilibrium. The discount rate required by the identical altruistic relationship is relatively low and stable. The degree of altruistic difference between the two sides of the game decides the existence of the discount rate required for maintaining long-term dynamic equilibrium. This paper makes important generalization for the pre-existing equilibrium analysis method of power market and the general repeated game method, and has certain theoretical value and practical significance.