Reparations and Symbolic Restitution

Abstract

Claims to symbolic restitution and material reparations for historical injustices are based on the moral quality of the deeds of previously living people and the lasting impact of their deeds on the well-being of currently living people, respectively. These grounds for claims to redressing historical injustices differ and raise different questions of interpretation. Currently living people can claim reparations for being indirect victims of historical injustices owing to their impact on their well-being. Such a justification of reparations raises two main questions of interpretation. First, how can currently living people be understood to be negatively affected by historical injustices even though the past injustices are among the necessary conditions for their very existence and identity? In response to so-called Non-Identity Problem I explicate (section I. 1), first, the idea of people being harmed since conception owing to the lack of (sufficient) compensation to their predecessors who were direct victims of historical injustice and, second, the notion of harm according to which people can be understood to be indirect victims due to their falling below a threshold level of well-being as a consequence of the historical injustice committed against previously living people. We also need to address, second, the question of whether this justification of reparations presupposes an indefensible interpretation of property entitlements—on that basis some have argued that claims owing to the impact of historical injustices should be considered superseded by the passage of time and changes of circumstances. I show that the conditions for the supersession of historical injustices are often not met (I. 2). Currently living people can claim symbolic reparation on behalf of the direct victims of historical injustice—namely owing to the wrongs they suffered. Such a justification for reparations raises the question of, inter alia, the moral status of deceased persons and dead victims of injustice in particular. I explicate—in section II. 1—the notion of surviving duties vis-a-vis deceased persons. I defend, in particular, the idea of a general surviving duty to bring about the posthumous reputation that people deserve (II. 2). Commemorative acts of symbolic reparation can be understood at aiming to fulfill this duty vis-a-vis dead victims of injustice. Finally—and in suggesting an answer to the question who might plausibly be thought to stand under the so understood and distinguished duties to provide