Reordering policy and coordination of a supply chain with a loss-averse retailer

Abstract

This paper develops three (re)ordering models of a supply chain consisting of one risk-neutral manufacturer and one loss-averse retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effects of the reordering policy on the coordination mechanism. The three (re)ordering policies are twice ordering policy with break-even quantity, twice ordering policy without break-even quantity and once ordering policy, respectively. We design a buyback-setup-cost-sharing mechanism to coordinate the supply chain for each policy, and Pareto analysis indicates that both the manufacturer and the retailer will realize a 'win-win' situation. By comparing the models, we find that twice ordering policy with break-even quantity is absolutely dominant for both the retailer and the supply chain. However, only if the break-even quantity is less than the mean quantity to failure, twice ordering policy without break-even quantity is dominant over the once ordering policy. The higher marginal revenue can induce more order quantity of the retailer under both twice ordering policy with break-even quantity and once ordering policy. However, it is interesting that it has no effect on the order plan of centralized decision-maker in twice ordering policy without break-even quantity.