Abstract
Based on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.
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