Abstract
The study concerns rent seeking in the allocation of the Structural Funds for cultural development in the region of Calabria. The Regional planning following the European guidelines was very complex. Own cultural axis, officially oriented to promote tourism, consisted of three measures, each oriented to four goals, with five strategies for each goal and seven specific actions, each articulate in a number of sub-actions, without any clear priority. In the statistical analysis the variables relating to the most important cultural sites had no significance. Rent seeking relating to no profits, to criminal hubs , to construction interests, to employment of people was significant. It may explain the fragmentation of the projects. On the other hand, the presence of the best cultural sites was not important in the disbursement of funds for the criminal hubs. The anomalous discrepancy between allocation of funds and payments also could be explained as a rent seeking phenomenon. The centre-right Government spent funds for investment projects, the centre-left Government devoted funds to service projects and the employment of unskilled labor and intellectual labor.
Highlights
The study examines the rent seeking phenomena arising in the execution of the European Program 2000-2006 for the less developed European regions (Note 1) focusing on the Operational Regional program (POR) of the Region of Calabria, Italy, as for the sector of cultural goods as tourism attractors. (Note 2)
The focus on this Program is of particular interest because it was managed by a center-right regional government from 2000 until spring 2005 and by central-left regional government from spring 2005 to the end, so that one may try to see if the change of Government from the centre right to the centre left has had an effect on the rent seeking
The Results showed that the majority of considered rent seeking variables no-profits, criminal hubs, type of government were relevant, while the variable “cultural sites” was not relevant, both in general terms and when they were tested with specific focus on criminal hubs
Summary
The study examines the rent seeking phenomena arising in the execution of the European Program 2000-2006 for the less developed European regions (so called Objective 1) (Note 1) focusing on the Operational Regional program (POR) of the Region of Calabria, Italy, as for the sector of cultural goods as tourism attractors. (Note 2). (Note 3) Independent variables were constructed to capture the main observable sources of rent seeking in the various municipalities: i..e. their voting weight, the presence of no profits and criminal hubs, the presence of members of the Regional junta ruling Calabria To these variables, was added, the presence in the municipality of important cultural sites, that could have justified the allocation of funds. The variable “type of government” was tested at regional level and observes whether it made difference about project types approved, distinguishing them in investment projects and service projects : the first most popular was about pro business Governments, and the second most popular with Governments interested to sustain employment It resulted that the most important rent seeking variables (voting weight), no profits, criminal hubs, type of government were relevant, while the variable “cultural sites” was not relevant, both and as a per se variable and in association with the variable criminal hubs
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