Rent Extraction through Political Extortion: An Empirical Examination

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Previous articleNext article No AccessRent Extraction through Political Extortion: An Empirical ExaminationR. Beck, C. Hoskins, and J. M. ConnollyR. Beck Search for more articles by this author , C. Hoskins Search for more articles by this author , and J. M. Connolly Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 21, Number 1Jan., 1992 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467905 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 10Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1992 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Gonul Colak, Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Panagiotis Loukopoulos, Georgios Loukopoulos Political power, local policy uncertainty and IPO pricing, Journal of Corporate Finance 67 (Apr 2021): 101907.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101907Dimiter Toshkov, David Lowery, Brendan Carroll, Joost Berkhout Timing is everything? Organized interests and the timing of legislative activity, Interest Groups & Advocacy 2, no.11 (Sep 2012): 48–70.https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.14Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis, Jung Chul Park Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power, Journal of Financial Economics 106, no.11 (Oct 2012): 196–228.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.007Justin H. Kirkland, Virginia Gray, David Lowery Policy Agendas, Party Control, and PAC Contributions in the American States, Business and Politics 12, no.44 (Jan 2017): 1–24.https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1307Jeffrey Haymond Class Action Rent Extraction: Theory and Evidence of Legal Extortion, (Jan 2010): 193–215.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230109490_10David Lowery, Virginia Gray, Matthew Fellowes Organized Interests and Political Extortion: A Test of the Fetcher Bill Hypothesis*, Social Science Quarterly 86, no.22 (Jun 2005): 368–385.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00308.xDavid Lowery, Virginia Gray, Matthew Fellowes, Jennifer Anderson Living in the Moment: Lags, Leads, and the Link Between Legislative Agendas and Interest Advocacy*, Social Science Quarterly 85, no.22 (Jun 2004): 463–477.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.08502014.xThomas W. Hazlett, Matthew L. Spitzer Digital Television and the Quid Pro Quo, Business and Politics 2, no.22 (Jan 2017): 115–159.https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1006R. L. Beck, J. M. Connolly Some empirical evidence on rent-seeking, Public Choice 87, no.1-21-2 (Apr 1996): 19–33.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00151727Fred S. McChesney Rent Extraction, (): 818–820.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_178