Abstract

Wireless sensor networks find applications everywhere in day to day activities right from attendance entry systems to healthcare monitoring systems. The evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) as the Internet of Everything (IoET) makes the wireless sensor network omnipresent and increases the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for the proper identification of devices and sensor nodes which are mostly battery operated. As technology evolves, security threats also increase rapidly. This mandates a strong and energy-efficient green solution. This work attempted to address these issues by effectively deploying the lightweight encryption scheme called Extended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA). Though the XTEA is lightweight and famous, it is commonly known for various attacks. Our work patches the security threats in the XTEA by applying domain-specific customization, random number utilization, and undisclosed key renewal techniques. Two custom Renovated XTEA Mutual Authentication Protocol (RXMAP) encoder architectures, namely, RXMAP-1 and RXMAP-2, are proposed based on the replacement of accurate computational blocks with approximate blocks. The proposed RXMAP protocol is evaluated for its computational and storage overhead and verified against various security threats using BAN logic formal verification and informal verification. The proposed encoder architectures are simulated for functional verification, and ASIC implementation is done with a 132 nm process node. ASIC implementation results show that the proposed designs RXMAP-1 and RXMAP-2 occupy 53.11% and 53.31% lesser area compared to XTEA I and 52.97% and 53.18% lesser area compared to XTEA II implementation. The total power consumed by the proposed encoder architectures RXMAP-1 and RXMAP-2 is 68.76% and 71.64% lesser than XTEA II implementation, respectively, while maintaining the equal throughput.

Highlights

  • Wireless sensor networks are composed of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and low power-consuming sensors [3]

  • The evaluation of the propounded Renovated XTEA Mutual Authentication Protocol (RXMAP) protocol is done on the basis of security requirements, computation overhead, and storage requirements to ensure its strength and lightweight to deploy it in the green energy devices

  • It is proved that the proposed designs RXMAP I and RXMAP II occupy 53.11% and 53.31% lesser area compared to XTEA I and 52.97% and 53.18% lesser area compared to XTEA II implementation

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Summary

Introduction

Advancement in technology facilitates people to enjoy wireless devices with smart sensors. Deploying complex security algorithms is not a feasible solution for Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing the WSN components. This leads to the lightweight cryptography domain. Standard block encryption schemes need to be customized to make it fit in the RFID or sensor nodes. The requirements of the passive RFID EPC class 1 generation 2 tags [28] are that the design should have less than 10000 gate equivalent which includes security and functional handling chip components and circuit should be operated with low power which the tag receives from the reader as a trigger. This work RXTEA addresses the above mentioned issues without compromising any of the requirements of RFID EPC class 1 generation 2 tags, and it is a suitable candidate for the mutual authentication in passive tags and green wireless sensor network applications. The proposed protocol architecture is implemented in ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) design flow with the technology process (130 nm)

The Significant
Organization
Related Works
Proposed Renovated XTEA Mutual Authentication Protocol Architecture
Renovated XTEA Encoder Architecture
Approximate Adders for RXMAP Encoder
Renovated XTEA-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol
Security Analysis
Formal Analysis
BAN Logic Analysis
Security against the Tag’s Identity Reveal
Resistance to Known Session-Specific Temporary Information Attack
Mutual Authentication
Forward and Backward Security
Resistance to Replay Attack
Resistance against Impersonation Attack
Security against Man-In-The-Middle Attack
Resistance to Masquerade Attack
Resistance to Desynchronization Attack
4.2.10. Anonymity and Untraceability
4.2.11. Related Key Attack
Security Requirements
Storage Requirement
ASIC Implementation of the RXMAP Encoder Architecture
Conclusion
Full Text
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