Abstract
A Biden presidency certainly ensures the revisiting of the debate on whether the United States should pursue the implementation of a No First Use (NFU) policy. Today, the United States follows a negative security assurance policy, only threatening first use in “extreme circumstances” against states with nuclear capabilities or those who are not in compliance with their Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. While the ultimate goal of the United States' nuclear policy should be in the direction of a policy of no first use and a severe reduction of the role of nuclear capabilities in security measures in order to reduce the chances of a nuclear conflict, a premature NFU would cause counter-productive responses to our goal of nuclear non-proliferation while also risking critical assets. Nuclear declaratory policy is all but a waiting game; with adversaries ever-increasing in power, allies concerned with the United States’ level of commitment, and the evolution of non-strategic military technologies, the wait for no first use is far from over.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.