Abstract
The golden crab ( Chaceon fenneri ) supports a small, economically healthy fishery in south Florida. Crabbers in the fishery have successfully protected themselves against larger outside fishing interests in the past, and management has been stable for over fifteen years. Why, then, did a portion of the fleet propose shifting to individual transferable quotas (ITQs)? Our findings suggest that proponents sought ITQ management because they believed it would further limit the ability of other crabbers to enter the fishery and act as a mechanism to legally preserve the informal and formal property rights that they have previously negotiated among themselves. Opponents believed that a shift to an ITQ regime would destroy those same property rights. We explore the implications of these findings to a broader understanding of property rights and natural resource management institutions, noting that the currently existing system closely resembles a territorial use rights fishery (TURF).
Highlights
Within environmental economics and the broader common-pool resource management community, there is a long-standing debate over the role that fishery rights regimes play in common-pool resource management
Did a portion of the fleet propose shifting to individual transferable quotas (ITQs)? Our findings suggest that proponents sought ITQ management because they believed it would further limit the ability of other crabbers to enter the fishery and act as a mechanism to legally preserve the informal and formal property rights that they have previously negotiated among themselves
We explore the implications of these findings to a broader understanding of property rights and natural resource management institutions, noting that the currently existing system closely resembles a territorial use rights fishery (TURF)
Summary
Within environmental economics and the broader common-pool resource management community, there is a long-standing debate over the role that fishery rights regimes play in common-pool resource management. A portion of these crabbers proactively sought to become the first new ITQs fishery in the waters managed by the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council in over 20 years These events raise the following question: Why did some golden crabbers seek out individual transferable quotas (ITQs) when their existing system appears to be working? After providing context for this research in the broader literature, we describe the methods and resources used to study the golden crab fishery and provide a history of the fishery leading to a description of its current institutional structure This is followed by a discussion of the reasoning of the crabbers – all of whom sought to preserve their existing property rights – but took sharply different positions on whether ITQs would support or degrade the existing formal and informal management regime. We explore the implications of these findings to a broader understanding of property rights and natural resource management institutions
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
