Abstract
This chapter studies the post-crisis regulation of remuneration policies in investment firms. The main focus is on variable remuneration, because such compensation schemes highlight the conflict between owners' governance, on one hand, and financial stability and investor protection on the other. The regulation of remuneration in investment firms is one of many attempts to regulate with the purpose of improving corporate governance. The chapter then discusses how MiFID II and related regulation impacts on corporate governance of investment firms, with remuneration policies as examples and the focus of discussion. It links two different levels of accountability already established in literature: the firm level of accountability and the regulatory level of accountability. The reforms of the regulation of investment firms also give reasons to assess whether the EU regulatory policy for the financial markets is changing.
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