Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the effectiveness of remuneration committees on narrative voluntary disclosure of information on remuneration. We develop a composite measure as a proxy for remuneration committee effectiveness by incorporating remuneration committee size, remuneration committee independence, remuneration committee chairman's independence, expertise and diligence. We find that both the existence and quality of a remuneration committee play a significant role in the decision to provide voluntary disclosure of remuneration actions and in the extent of this disclosure. Further analysis suggests that remuneration committee independence and diligence enhance the quality of remuneration committees. The results have policy implications for remuneration committees as an effective corporate governance mechanism.
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