Remote Data Checking With a Designated Verifier in Cloud Storage

Abstract

Remote data possession checking (RDPC) supplies an efficient manner to verify the integrity of the files stored in cloud storage. Public verification allows anyone to check the integrity of remote data so that it has a wider application in public cloud storage. Private verification just allows the data owner to verify the data integrity, which is mainly applied for the verification of secret data. However, in many real applications, the data owner expects a specific user to check the files in cloud storage, whereas others cannot execute such work. It is obvious that neither public verification nor private verification can satisfy such a requirement. To solve this issue, Ren et al . provided a designated-verifier provable data possession (DV-PDP) protocol. Unfortunately, the DV-PDP is insecure against replay attack launched by the malicious cloud server. To overcome this shortcoming, we present a new RDPC scheme with the designated verifier, in which the data owner specifies a unique verifier to check the data integrity. Based on the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption, we prove the security for our RDPC scheme in a random oracle model. The theoretical analysis and experiment results indicate that our scheme has less communication, storage, and computation overhead while achieving high error detection probability.