Abstract
For years ICTY sentencing practice has deemed an accused's expression of remorse to be a factor in mitigation of sentence. This article examines whether the ICTY has adequately elucidated the theoretical and purposive basis for its reliance on this factor. It observes that, although the Tribunal has addressed from the outset the need to ensure that this subjective factor is not contrived, it has only belatedly identified the relationship between an expression of remorse and the fundamental sentencing objective of reconciliation.
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