Abstract
ABSTRACT How do financial remittances influence electoral participation in violent democracies? Previous work has focused on the ‘substitution effect’; if recipients depend on remittances for welfare rather than the state, they become disengaged from formal political processes and less likely to vote in elections. However, while remittances can be used to substitute for state provision of welfare goods, they cannot fully substitute for public security. In this paper, we posit that the ability of governments to contain crime and violence conditions the effect of remittances on electoral participation. Specifically, we argue that high levels of crime can negate the substitution effect and make remittance recipients more likely to vote. Using municipality-level data from Mexico and individual-level data from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, we find that both the receipt of remittances and crime exposure significantly reduce individuals’ propensity to vote and that aggregate remittances and crime rates are correlated with lower turnout. Remittances can, however, negate the turnout-suppressing effects of crime, and crime can negate the turnout-suppressing effects of remittances. Our results suggest a need to account for government provision of both substitutable and non-substitutable goods when investigating the effects of remittances on political participation.
Highlights
How do international remittances complement the capacity of the state to provide security to the citizenry? Recent research has provided significant insights into the relationship between remittance inflows, electoral participation and welfare goods provision (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Germano 2013, 2018), but the relationship between remittances and security remains understudied
We have shown that the turnout-suppressing effects of violence and remittances do not reinforce one another
While remittance recipients can afford to buy some level of private security for themselves, they cannot fully substitute for a lack of public security provided by a government
Summary
The second uses survey data from Latin America and Africa and explores whether individual perceptions of insecurity and crime victimisation influence the incentives of remittance-recipients to participate in elections. At both levels of analysis, we find that remittances negate the turnout-suppressing effects of crime and that crime negates the turnout-suppressing effects of remittances. We discuss how remittances and crime can affect electoral turnout and advance a series of hypotheses about the interactive effect of remittance receipt and experiences and fears of crime on voting. We turn to survey data from Latin America and Africa to explore the individual-level relationship between receipt of remittances, experiences and fears of crime and the propensity to vote. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and suggesting potential avenues for further research
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