Abstract

In 2009, the New York Times published a short article detailing how a local warlord in southern Afghanistan was receiving millions of dollars a month to “secure” a local highway for U.S. forces. What the article failed to note was that the road was built by United States Army and the United States Agency for International Development from 2004–2005 as the centerpiece of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Southern Afghanistan. The story of the road is one of optimistic U.S. construction, co-option by a local strongman, and ultimately security collapse and Taliban control. Analysis of the road construction effort and what occurred after it was completed reveals dynamics that impacted and ultimately derailed both the counterinsurgency effort in region through which the road ran and the broader U.S. effort in Afghanistan. It also provides lessons that should be retained and considered before the United States’ next effort to both defeat an adversary and reshape a society.

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