Remedial Control Scheme of PV Systems Against Cyber-Attack in AC Microgrid

Abstract

The advent of various power systems components, like Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), modern communication protocols and advanced controlling schemes, has enhanced the reliable and secure operation of power systems over time. However, it has also introduced some weak points, which could conversely result in detrimental effects on the same. One of the major concerns is cyber threats. The change in grid topology from grid-connected to islanding is supposed to take place recklessly, followed by a change in the control mode of the DERs and settings of the protective devices in a smooth manner, and indeed a cyber intrusion can hamper it all without prior knowledge of the grid operators. The situation could get worse if the targeted DERs are supposed to form the grid post-islanding. This paper addresses this issue by considering Area-II of banshee microgrid deploying BESS and PV system, and a resilient remedial action is proposed to cope with the same. Furthermore, this study has been implemented on a Cyber-Physical testbed using CHIL (Control Hardware-in-the-loop) in real-time by incorporating RTDS. The role of the SCADA master station has been served by PAS (Protection and Automation Suite) tool and SEL RTAC microgrid controller. The application of modern communication protocol, IEC 61850 GOOSE, has also been explored in DERs' control and monitoring applications.