Remarks on the Convergence of Opinion Formation in the Presence of Self-Interest and Conformity

Abstract

In this work, we study the decision-making processes of heterogeneous agents, who take decisions regarding their individual preferences as well as their attempt to conform. Under the assumptions of certain topologies of interactions and with cognitive and informational restrictions, we analyze the evolution of these decisions over time with an agent-based model. In addition, the study analyzes the existence of a power-law in the convergence of the model to dynamic equilibrium. To this aim, the notion of interface density is introduced, as a measure for the speed of convergence, and linked to the dynamic analysis. The results of this work allow us to understand how social processes influence the relationship between individual and social preferences, along with the influence of random decisions made by individuals. A greater importance of the individual component implies outcomes with polarization processes (a greater quantity of groups). In a model with random decisions, patterns of conformity arise more frequently.