Reluctant aid or aiding the reluctant?: U.S. food aid policy and Ethiopian famine relief

Abstract

This book undertakes a systematic analysis responsibilities for the 1983-86 Ethiopian famine and its relief, drawing upon a wide range materials and personal observation in Ethiopia itself. Ethiopia's sponsorship famine is described by tracing its origins to revolutionary food policies, reinforced by the restructuring external relations and development strategies away from the West and toward the communist world. The policy sources the famine are described in detail, assessing expectations about regional variations in Ethiopian food policy and the inducement famine. Military struggles and economic stagnation associated with collectivization efforts are considered to have produced consumption shortages in war zones and stable regions alike. In this context Ethiopian disavowal and American hesitancy, a broad relief policy was fashioned. This book describes in rich intimacy conflicts between donor and recipient governments - a conflict about the uses aid for either famine relief as such or the pursuit radical national transformation. Unique in its dual focus on policy from a donor nation and recipient nation alike, Varnis's work offers the specialist in African affairs, international relations, and policy analysis a keen sense how policies are made and changed over time to meet circumstances a highly volatile and unique sort. Vamis's work is rich in theoretical implications for social development, for this was more than a conventional relief effort. It was an effort that failed to advance specifically Western interests, and served to stabilize the socialist orientation and dictatorial control the Ethiopian State. Just what this means in terms ideological priorities and the dependency paradigm forms the basis the assessment the conclusion of Reluctant Aid.