Abstract
ABSTRACTThis paper examines the problems associated with conceptualizing religious freedom within a human rights order that remains indebted to secular principles. It considers the theological-political premises of the modern secular State, the function of religious tolerance as a liberal-democratic discourse, how political subjectivity is constructed through the concepts of freedom and equality, and the inequality inherent in the secular vehicle of the neutral public sphere. It suggests that the potential for human rights law to protect religious difference lies in understanding the theological-political bias in secularism and renegotiating the relationship between religious pluralism and democratic principles.
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