Religious Concepts of Punishment and Reward

Abstract

Not all theological problems have had the same share of philosophical luck. The problem of evil, for example, has been subjected to intense and thorough scrutiny both by theologians such as Augustine and by philosophers such as Leibniz. By contrast, the concepts of reward and punishment - which for so long have played a major role in the theologies of many religions - have been relatively neglected by contemporary philosophy of religion. If the task of philosophy of religion is to examine, clarify, and evaluate concepts that play a role in religion or religions, then philosophy of religion cannot afford to ignore concepts that play a role in actual religious practice, in favor of theological concepts. On this account, religious concepts with a long tradition of both theological and practical nature deserve special attention - and the concepts of reward and punishment are a case in point. In this article we wish to take a few initial steps in analysing religious concepts of reward and punishment. We will not review the development of notions of reward and punishment, nor will we dwell at length on the role these concepts have played in religious education and daily practice, in Western as well as Eastern religions. Instead we will lay out in the first part of the article the problem of philosophical analysis of concepts of reward and punishment, and then set forth adequacy conditions for its solution. After discussing the legal notion of punishment in the wake of classical and modern definitions, we shall propose a religious extension of the concept that will be similar to the legal analysis but will reflect several distinctions related to the religious context of punishment. Later, we shall see how it is possible to define concepts of reward and punishment minimally, i.e., without ontological or religious value-commitments. We shall confine our discussion to systems of constitutive religious rules.